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This article engages with and draws on what have been called two recent ‘turns’ in 
feminist theory: to beauty and to affect.  While much feminist research has 
concentrated on the beauty industry, where beauty is conceived as a series of 
economic, social and cultural practices, we suggest that beauty should also be 
understood as an embodied affective process. Our focus is on understanding the 
conceptions of beauty that emerged in our own empirical work with white British 
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girls (Coleman 2009) and mestiza Mexican women (Moreno Figueroa 2006). We 
suggest that for the girls and women in our research, beauty is an inclination towards 
a perfected temporal state which involve processes of displacement to the past and of 
deferral to the future. We draw on Colebrook’s (2006) discussion of the relationship 
between feminist theory and philosophies of aesthetic beauty and on Lauren Berlant’s 
notions of ‘cruel optimism’ (2006, 133-137)  and ‘aspirational normalcy’  and argue 
that beauty can be seen as an aspiration to normalcy that is, simultaneously, optimistic 
and cruel.  Beauty is seemingly characterised by its inability ‘to be’ in the present and 
is thus positioned as temporalities that have passed or have yet to come. Through 
these displacements and deferrals, beauty is understood as both specific and 
imaginary, and as promising and depressing.  Following on from such a conception of 
beauty, we make a distinction between optimism and hope and argue that while, in 
Berlant’s terms, optimism is that which is cruel, hope might involve a different way of 































Past and Future Perfect? Beauty, Affect and Hope 
 
In my life what has been most important is the issue of 
beauty… (Paulina) 
 
[H]opefully […], all the things I don’t like just go away 
and it like just works out that I look really good (Fay) 
 
How long have people thought about the present as 
having weight, being a thing disconnected from other 
things, an obstacle to living? (Berlant 2006, 24) 
 
In a special edition of Feminist Theory (2006), Colebrook argues in her introduction 
that renewed interest in the ‘question of beauty for feminist politics […] is not so 
much moral – is beauty good or bad for women? – but pragmatic: how is beauty 
defined, deployed, defended, subordinated, marked or manipulated, and how do these 
tactics intersect with gender and value?’ (2006, 132).  In this paper we explore the 
‘pragmatics’ of this feminist ‘return to beauty’ and explore the problem of beauty 
through another ‘turn’ in feminist cultural theory to affect. We argue that affect is a 
productive way of exploring beauty because it emphasises not only content but also 
process; that is, it is not only necessary to examine specific beauty practices (of make-
up, hair styling, dieting and cosmetic surgery for example) but it is also important to 
see beauty as an embodied social, cultural and economic process.   
 
Taking an approach which attends to the ways in which ‘the lure of beauty seems 
inescapable’ (Felski 2006, 278), we suggest an understanding of beauty as hope. Our 
interest is in exploring hope as ‘an empirical question’ (Back 2009); as the above 
quotations from Paulina and Fay indicate, we examine how hope is attached to beauty 
and is experienced and understood in everyday life.  Our focus is on understanding 
the conceptions of beauty that emerged in our own empirical work with white British 
girls (Coleman 2009) and mestiza Mexican women (Moreno Figueroa 2006).  We 
draw on Colebrook’s (2006) discussion of the relationship between feminist theory 
and philosophies of aesthetic beauty and on Lauren Berlant’s notions of ‘cruel 
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optimism’ (2006) and ‘aspirational normalcy’  and argue that beauty can be seen as an 
aspiration to normalcy that is, simultaneously, optimistic and cruel. We suggest that 
for the girls and women in our research, beauty is equated with a sense of perfection; 
beauty is an inclination towards a temporal state whereby, as Fay explains, ‘all the 
things I don’t like just go away and it like just works out that I look really good’.  In 
particular, we focus on the temporalities of these inclinations and suggest that the girls 
and women experience beauty as temporal processes of displacement to the past and 
of deferral to the future. Beauty is expressed from the present but is not located there; 
beauty is seemingly characterised by its inability ‘to be’ in the present and is thus 
positioned as temporalities that have passed or have yet to come. Through these 
displacements and deferrals, beauty is understood as both specific and imaginary, and 
as promising and depressing.  Following on from such a conception of beauty, we 
make a distinction between optimism and hope and argue that while, in Berlant’s 
terms, optimism is that which is cruel, hope might involve a different way of thinking 
about how beauty might be experienced.  
 
The research we discuss here are two separate projects which address, in different 
ways, questions of embodiment, image and visuality.  One project, by Moreno 
Figueroa (2006), focuses on the significance of the role of emotions in revealing 
Mexican women’s lived experiences of racism and explores the importance of 
mestizaje (racial and cultural intermixing of Spanish and American Indigenous 
people) in relation to Mexican discourses of race and nation.  The other project, by 
Coleman (2009), explores the ways in which thirteen 13 and 14 year old British girls 
experience their bodies through images and argues that bodies and images are not 
separable entities but rather that images make possible particular knowledges and 
experiences of bodies.  Both projects involved focus group and individual interviews 
and involved visual methodologies; Moreno Figueroa used personal photographs 
during life-story interviews to guide women’s telling of their lives and also to discuss 
the relationships between racism, bodies and visibility and explore how they see 
themselves and how others see them and Coleman used personal photographs and 
magazine images to stimulate discussion and an ‘image-making session’ to produce 
visual, as well as verbal, experiences of bodies.  While neither project enquired 
specifically about beauty and appearance, such issues emerged as important in the 
participant’s accounts.  For example, the women in Moreno Figueroa’s research 
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discussed beauty in terms of racialised perceptions of their bodies which are a product 
of cultural and historical understandings of mestizaje as a way of perfecting and 
‘improving the race’ through mixing and of gendered ideas about femininity: the 
whiter the prettier, the darker the uglier. In addition, these women also talk about 
beauty in terms of emotions: mainly experiences of shame, feeling inadequate and 
aspiring for a normalcy that ‘should/could’ be granted by such process of proper 
racial mixing.  For the girls in Coleman’s research, beauty was alluded to in terms of 
what might be characterised as a general dissatisfaction with their present appearance, 
and a hope that they would feel better about their appearance in the future, or as a 
satisfaction with their present appearance and a hope that this feeling would continue 
into the future.   
 
It is clear then that our projects raise different understandings of and feelings towards 
beauty.  Our aim is not to suggest that the experiences of beauty discussed are 
equivalent or uniform but rather to draw attention to some points of connection which 
coalesce around ideas of temporality and to examine these connections through the 
notions of hope, optimism and normalcy. The article is arranged around some key 
themes that we see as arising in both projects: (i) the displacement of beauty to the 
past; (ii) the deferral of beauty to the future and; (iii) in the concluding sections, wider 
issues concerning the ethics of hope, beauty and temporality. In order to contextualise 
these themes, we first outline our argument concerning the relationship between 
recent work on beauty and on affect drawing on the contributions that feminist 
scholarship has made to understandings of the complexity of beauty.  
 
Beauty, affect and inclination 
It is clear from Paulina’s statement above and from the strong tradition of feminist 
scholarship surveying its various aspects, that ‘[f]or women, beauty has always 
mattered – in a personal way, and as an inevitable, and underlying socio-political 
framework, for how they operate in the world’ (Brand 2000, 5-6). Recent feminist 
work has identified how approaches to beauty tend to circulate around the 
dichotomies of pleasure-pain, active-passive, affirmation-suffering, liberation-
oppression. Felski (2006) suggests that such feminist analyses have converted the 
‘positive’ aspects of beauty into their more ‘negative’ counterpoints. She raises 
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concerns about this ‘compulsion to immediately translate aesthetic surfaces into 
political depths’ without ‘teasing apart the multifarious socio-political meanings of 
texts while also crafting richer and thicker descriptions of aesthetic experience’ (2006, 
281). Questioning the arguments claiming that concerns, practices and experiences 
about beauty are either superfluous, ‘wrong’ and/or a source of pain, here we follow 
Felski’s aim to engage in a feminist task that explores beauty as both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’. Only in this way, she argues, ‘can we continue to reckon the political costs 
of being beautiful while also doing justice to the reasons why, all of us, women 
included, continue to seek out and take solace in beauty’ (2006, 281).   
 
Felski’s point that beauty is both framed socially, economically and politically and 
experienced aesthetically is key to our conception of the relationship between hope 
and the girls’ and women’s understandings of beauty.  In particular, Felski’s argument 
that beauty is a ‘lure’ which ‘seems inescapable’ (Felski 2006: 278) leads us to 
examine the relationship between beauty and hope not so much in terms of specific 
beauty practices or ‘body work’ (Davis 1995, Gimlin 2002) but as an embodied 
affective process or inclination.  Colebrook’s discussion of different philosophical 
conceptions of aesthetics is helpful here as she draws attention to how beauty has 
been understood both as that which is tied to pleasure, utility and the furthering of life 
(as Hume argued) and as that which escapes or exceeds utility and the beauty industry 
(as in the Kantian tradition) (2006, 133-137). Both understandings of beauty, 
Colebrook argues, are relevant for contemporary feminist work.  On the one hand, 
seeing beauty as that which is either emerging from, or useful for, the nurturing of life 
enables an attention to the ways in which ‘the beautiful may have been defined 
through a series of gendered and sexist examples and assumptions’ (2006, 134) and 
thus to the specific ‘interests it serves and how it has been valued’ (2006, 136). 
However, ‘[o]n the other hand, the experience of the beautiful as feeling can neither 
be explained away nor reduced to its political uses and abuses’ (2006, 134). While 
feminist empirical sociology and cultural studies has tended to focus on beauty as an 
industry (for example Black 2004, Craig 2006, Holliday and Sanchez Taylor 2006) 
we are also interested in beauty as that which cannot be contained within these 
practices.   
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As a hope, beauty can be understood in terms of Kant’s conception of aesthetic beauty 
as Colebrook explains it: ‘whatever the actual experience and industry of the beautiful 
may be, there is also a critical capacity and imperative to discern the genesis and 
irreducibility of the beautiful’ (2006, 133). As such, for Kant, ‘[t]he “aesthetic” 
concerns nothing more than feeling: not a feeling of the body but of the mind 
experiencing itself, being given a sense of its own “supersensible” power’ (2006, 133). 
The conception of beauty as feeling has resonances with what has been called ‘the 
affective turn’ (Clough and Hailey 2007) in (feminist) social and cultural theory (see 
for example Ahmed 2001, Ahmed 2004, Probyn 2005, Riley 2005, Sedgwick and 
Frank 2003).  In particular, our understanding of affect here draws on work which 
Patricia Ticineto Clough describes as engaging with ‘the line of thought from Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari back through Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson’ (2007, 
1). According to this tradition, affect ‘refers generally to bodily capacities to affect 
and be affected’ and ‘is linked to the self-feeling of being alive – that is, aliveness or 
vitality’ (2007, 2).  Such a conception of affect – as embodied feeling – clearly 
connects with Colebrook’s account of aesthetic beauty.  Our argument here is that 
beauty works as an affective aesthetic feeling.  Despite its organisation into an 
industry which serves a particular set of interests and gives value to specific body 
practices, beauty is continually sought out and taken solace in.   
 
As we have suggested then, beauty is, in Berlant’s (2002) terms, a bodily ‘inclination’ 
or ‘tendency’. In a discussion of what she characterises as the sensual pleasures/pains 
of eating, sex and intelligence (or ‘smartness’), Berlant argues that such ‘dense 
moments of sensuality’ (2002, 85) ‘produce something not uncomplicated or 
amnesiac, but something that as yet has no content, just inclination’ (2002, 85-86 our 
emphasis)i.  Taking up Berlant’s conception and drawing on the notions of affect and 
aesthetics introduced above, we want to suggest that beauty, as it emerged in our 
research, is such a bodily inclination; not located in anything (as content) but a 
process which exists as and is produced through the relations between bodies, things, 
memories, dreams and hopes. Understood in this way, for the women and girls in our 
research, beauty involves a bodily inclination towards a more hopeful temporality.  In 
this sense, and as we develop further below, hope is an embodied affect; that is, hope 
is the feeling that inclines towards the beautiful (where the content of what is 
beautiful might not yet be clear) and that provides a sense of being alive.  As such an 
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inclination, hope is a productive way of understanding how beauty is located in times 
other than the present. An inclination suggests that bodies are tending towards a time 
(and space) other than where they are presently located.  In the following two sections, 
we unpack the discussions of beauty that emerged in our research. First, we attend to 
the ways beauty is experienced in the past and present and in the following section we 
examine the deferral of beauty to the future.ii 
 
Beauty and the past 
Central to our conception of the relationship between hope and beauty is the way in 
which beauty is not a ‘thing’ which can be experienced in the present but is that which 
is felt in different temporalities. In the research data we use here, various accounts of 
appearance, the body and beauty emerged in relationships with the past. For example, 
some of the participants in Coleman’s research indicated how moving to a new school 
and becoming a teenager had focused their and other’s attention on their appearance: 
 
Fay:  […] it’s sort of like secondary school really because before that you know 
you’re just happy cos things like [appearance] don’t matter, just happy 
playing and being a child, you know now […] you meet new people and 
new attitudes towards you that you never really experienced before […] and 
it’s like different attitudes and different ways of looking at yourself I think 
when you come up here 
 
In this extract, Fay discusses her present as a time when things like appearance 
‘matter’ in contrast to her explanation of her past as a time when she was ‘happy’, 
‘just enjoying being a kid’. Fay links being at secondary school, ‘different attitudes 
and different ways of looking at yourself’ and not being happy any more. While she 
does not describe her present as being unhappy, she does point to the difficulty of 
being happy because she is unaware of her body and her appearance. Whereas in 
Fay’s past happiness was unconnected from her body and appearance, a condition of 
being happy in her present necessarily involves what she looks like.  
 




 Beckie: so do you think the way you feel now, is that new, or have you always been 
sort of feeling like that? 
Anna: I never was really bothered about what I used to look like until […] 
secondary school, I think that puts a lot of pressure on, and year 7 and 8 
were always what I looked like, year 9 I sort of think, sort of stopped and 
thought well hey, it’s my life it’s no-one else’s so I can look like what I 
want to look like and it’s not, erm, what’s the word, it’s me, it’s no-one else, 
I’ve got to control it to make myself happy 
Beckie:  ok, and do you think, are you succeeding in that or is it hard? 
Anna:  well yeah cos whenever you think you feel good, someone always puts you 
down 
Beckie: Really? And is that in school or out of school? 
Anna:  anywhere really, people do put you down, even if you think they might just 
be looking at you cos they think you look ok but you think they’re putting 
you down, cos sometimes you look at someone you think looks nice but 
then people think you’re looking at them saying they look horrible or 
something 
 
Again here we see a present in which happiness has become bound up with Anna’s 
appearance. Anna explains that this ‘puts a lot of pressure on’ which she is currently 
trying to ‘control […] to make myself happy’. However, this is difficult to achieve as 
while she may ‘feel good’ about what she looks like, other people’s gazes are 
interpreted as about her being seen as ‘horrible’.  
 
There are clearly many issues that could be unpacked from Fay’s and Anna’s 
comments concerning the role of adolescence, secondary school, the gendered gaze 
and what seems to be the increasing visibility of their bodies through a focus on 
appearance (see Coleman 2009, Moreno Figueroa 2006). What we are interested in 
here are the temporalities of beauty (in terms of the girls’ appearance, how they think 
they look and how they think others think they look). While neither Fay nor Anna 
describe themselves as beautiful in the past, they do depict their pasts as happier, at 
least in part because they were not ‘bothered’ about their looks. There is, then, an 
inclination to beauty in the past.  
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In contrast to the accounts above, some of the women who participated in Moreno 
Figueroa’s research raised issues about the concern with beauty in relation to both the 
past and present. Here, then, the case of Patricia illustrates the relevance of beauty and 
appearance across different temporalities: 
 
Patricia:  I feel insecure because of how I look. I mean my problem is that. So I 
remember in the nursery I was happy and everything, but I was kind of shy 
because of how I looked, can you imagine?  
 
Whereas Fay and Anna describe insecurity in their presents but not their pasts, 
Patricia’s memories of her past are already tempered with insecurity and a particular 
sense of her body. There is a part of Patricia’s account which complements Fay’s and 
Anna’s explanation of their pasts as a time when they are just happy ‘being a child’. 
However, Patricia also points to shyness and lack of confidence in her past, when she 
was a child, in clear reference to the appearance of her body: there has never been a 
time that she can remember when she was not aware of, nor unconcerned with, her 
body. It is important to note at this point that Patricia is discussing her bodily 
appearance in the context of research on experiences of mestizaje and racism and it is 
her ‘racialised’ appearance that she is highlighting as producing her insecurity. The 
experience that Patricia describes and the narrative produced are framed through the 
research questions so we cannot be sure what kind of narratives would have emerged 
had she just been asked to reflect on her time in the nursery. Would she, for example, 
just talk about the ‘happy and everything’ part of her account or would the 
‘racialisation’ of appearance inevitably emerge? However, in the account that Patricia 
does give, it is clear that her past is marked by how she looks and she implies her 
appearance is somehow not pleasant, perhaps not beautiful or not beautiful enough. 
This points towards a possible distinction between what aspects of the body matter 
and when they do so. So while perhaps the issue of beauty did not matter in Patricia’s 
childhood, a sense of what a racialised body ‘is like’ and ‘feels like’ was already 
evident. Patricia’s inclination to beauty is complex; while the lure of beauty is 
inescapable – how she looks is of central importance – there is no sense of what 
Felski terms ‘solace’ in the past.   
 
 11 
In other parts of Patricia’s interview the relevance of skin colour is emphasised: 
 
Patricia: This is my little cousin […] me and her were the same age, maybe a month 
apart, but I never managed to make friends with her, because, well, the 
barrier […] was our physical appearance. I wasn’t […] the colour […] - I 
mean the power of all this is incredible - because my colour prevented me 
from relating with my family. I don’t get on with them at all […] and when 
I’m with them, I feel very uncomfortable, I feel very inferior 
 
Patricia’s description of her past and present ‘uncomfortable’ relationships with her 
cousin and her family more widely, where she ‘feel[s] very inferior’, is founded upon 
‘the barrier’ of her skin colour and a sense of subordination and deficiency. She is 
aware of her position out of the boundaries of familial normality where the rules of a 
racialised beauty are clearly in operation. In her discussion of racially and sexually 
marked and unmarked bodies, Peggy Phelan argues that when trying to understand the 
basis for distinctions between ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ (or in the Mexican case, 
between ‘indigenous’, ‘mestizas’ or ‘güeras’iii), ‘the focus on the skin as the visible 
marker of race’ (1996, 10) and a key criteria for understandings of beauty (at least in 
the Mexican case) becomes significant. Whilst skin colour cannot contain all the 
possible meanings of ‘race’, it does become a crucial filtering surface that marks the 
body, as Patricia points out, indicating that she has a different relationship to 
appearance and temporality than Fay and Anna, and therefore, a different relationship 
to the hope that beauty might involve. While Patricia is inclined to beauty, in the 
sense that she places her appearance as central to her happiness, her present is no 
more hopeful regarding beauty than Fay’s and Anna’s; ‘I feel insecure because of 
how I look. I mean my problem is that’.  
 
Although Patricia’s comments are characterised by ‘racial’ marking through skin 
colour and the impossibility of being unaware of her bodily appearance, there are 
other accounts in Moreno Figueroa (2006)’s work pointing to a different experience. 
Consider, for example, Paulina’s comments on when she was most happy: 
 
Paulina:  For me, going to the U.S. was huge, very liberating, I was so happy. It was 
great not to be with my family. […] So then, going to live there, to prove 
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myself that I could do things on my own, that I could do a Ph.D. […] 
because for good or bad, my identity never was […] I never was the pretty 
one, nor the seductive one, or something like that, my little space in life was 
to be the clever one and dedicate myself to academia, but even in that area I 
had lots of insecurities and lack of self-esteem. So then for me to be able to 
do the PhD was really important.  
 
In this extract, Paulina explains that her most liberating and ‘happy’ time in the past 
was moving to the United States to study for a Ph.D. and ‘to prove to myself that I 
could do things on my own’. Part of the reason for this liberation and happiness, she 
suggests, was that ‘dedicat[ing] myself to academia’ was ‘my little space in life’. 
What is interesting here is how Paulina implies that an academic identity is distinct 
from being ‘the pretty one’ or ‘the seductive one’. To be ‘the clever one’, according to 
Paulina, is to not have to construct her identity through her bodily appearance. Indeed, 
while she implies that her insecurity about her appearance remains, she explains that 
the importance of completing a Ph.D. was in overcoming such insecurities: ‘even in 
that area I had lots of insecurities and lack of self-esteem’. For Paulina, then, 
academia is used as that ‘little space in life’, a space of normality where she can be 
‘clever’ and where she believes her body and its appearance, somehow, does not 
matter.  
 
What seems to us to emerge from these very different accounts is that beauty in the 
present is a difficult, if not impossible, experience. While there are different ways the 
girls and women recognise and (attempt to) ‘control’ the importance of beauty in their 
presents (by constructing an identity which is distinct from beauty, by thinking ‘well 
hey, it’s my life it’s no-one else’s so I can look like what I want to look like’, or by 
identifying different ‘attitudes’ and ‘barriers’), and there are crucial differences in the 
experiences of beauty in their pasts, the inclination to beauty, the inescapable lure of 
beauty, is ever present. In the following section we examine how the inclination to 
beauty involves a deferral to the future.   
 
Beauty and the future 
Beckie:  do ever kind of imagine your body and yourself in the future at all? 
Fay:  yeah sometimes, I just think what I’ll be like when I grow up 
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Beckie:  and what would that be like? 
Fay:  just hopefully it, all the things I don’t like just go away and it like just 
works out that I look really good 
Beckie:  ok, so what would it look like in the future? 
Fay:  well, you’ve got to have the right figure and everything, that I won’t, sort of, 
all the stuff that comes with being a teenager, like spots and that, all that 
goes away, and I think that’s about it really, just like the figure really and I 
think skin 
 
In this extract taken from one of Coleman’s individual interviews, Fay describes her 
future as when ‘it like just works out that I look really good’.  According to Fay here, 
then, the future is a time of perfection, a time that she can look forward to ‘hopefully’. 
The future that Fay describes is one that is imagined through looks and appearance. 
That is, in imagining herself ‘grow[n] up’, Fay understands her ‘body’ and ‘self’ in 
the future through what she looks like. This lens of appearance through which the 
body is imagined in the future is key to our argument here. We want to suggest that, 
for the girls and women whose comments are explored in this section, the future is 
perfect, a time of beauty, or, at least, a temporality that is more beautiful than the 
present.  
 
The links that Fay makes between the present and the future are important to consider. 
Fay describes the future as a time that is in some ways disconnected from how she 
understands her body in the present; ‘all the things I don’t like just go away’. Indeed, 
later on in the interview Fay goes on to comment explicitly on how her future is 
connected to her present: 
 
Beckie:  so how does that relate to how you feel about your body now? 
Fay:  well, it’s what I wanna change now, what’s wrong with me now and 
what I want to change and I don’t know I suppose it’s only over the 
last few years I’ve started feeling insecure about myself, I mean I don’t 
remember being little and thinking ‘oh you know’, so I just hope those 
insecurities and stuff go away 
Beckie:  ok, so how you feel about your body now, is that better or worse than 
how you used to feel about your body? 
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Fay:  probably worse than how I used to feel cos I never used to, even if 
there were things wrong with me, I never used to think they were 
wrong with me so it’s worse now I am aware of it, but then in a way, I 
don’t know, in a way it’s better cos you know that at least you can try 
and sort it out or whatever, that you weren’t walking round looking 
stupid or whatever 
 
In considering the relations between her present and future, Fay highlights the 
insecurities she has about her body in the present and points to how her imagination 
of the future involves ‘what’s wrong with me now and what I want to change’. We 
can take from this that for Fay, her present body is impossible to sustain as an 
imagination into the future. Fay cannot imagine her present body in the future but 
instead conceives a body that is changed, that looks different. In making this 
comparison between her present body and future body, Fay refers to her past: ‘I don’t 
remember being little and thinking “oh you know”’. As we suggested in the previous 
section, the past is understood here as a time when Fay was unaware of ‘what’s 
wrong’ with her body and could be happy, whereas the present is understood as a time 
when Fay is too well aware of her body, and is insecure about her body because of 
this awareness. The present is also a time when Fay is aware of her possibilities of 
action: a time when it is possible to intervene ‘cos you know that at least you can try 
and sort it out or whatever’. The present is thought of as a platform for the happy 
future and such a platform is hopeful and embraced in terms of what can be done in it. 
The present is the time where the body can, hopefully, be changed in order to be 
possible in the future.  
 
For Paulina, the present is also seen as a time which is in some way not as bearable as 
the future might be. However, whereas Fay describes being unaware of (the problems 
with) her body in her past, Paulina discusses how she was constantly made aware of 
her body in the past: 
 
Paulina: In my life what has been most important is the issue of beauty, because 
I always say, joking, that I’m the daughter and the mother of the 
beautiful ones. My mother had the kind of beauty that could stop a 
train, and it’s not that my sister and I are ugly, but just ordinary.... For 
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example when I was a kid, the neighbours would say things like: ‘Oh 
these girls, with such an attractive mother’, so my sister and I grew up 
with that, but when my daughter was born, you know what people 
would say to me? ‘Oh, so beautiful!’ Then they would turn, look at me, 
and say: ‘She must be exactly like her father!’ And I used to think: 
‘Why they don’t say: what a beautiful girl and that’s it?’ Do you know 
what I mean? It was a terrible thing, and I grew up with those issues, I 
don’t think that I’m ugly, but I always carry the ambivalence of what 
feminine beauty is about and that undoubtedly is something… my 
sister even had a nose job and me, just a while ago, I had a photograph 
taken in Canada, I was also thinking of having a nose job too.  
 
In this extract Paulina places herself in-between her mother and her daughter; she is, 
in some ways, a present between a past (her mother) and a future (her daughter). This 
past and future is understood through beauty as Paulina describes both her mother and 
her daughter as beautiful. In contrast to the past and future, her mother and her 
daughter, Paulina describes herself as ‘not ugly, just ordinary’. She describes how she 
is, and has been made to be, aware of herself as not beautiful, as being somehow 
problematic to the flow between the past and future. This is not just a present situation, 
as with for Fay, as the ‘ordinariness’ of Paulina’s body has been marked out for her in 
the past; ‘Oh these girls, with such an attractive mother’. With comments such as 
these, it is as if Paulina is pointing to how her mother and daughter are described as 
beautiful as unviable options for her; Paulina and her sister grow up knowing that 
people will not say of them when they are older, ‘Oh, so beautiful!’  
 
However, despite this non-beautiful past and present, the way in which Paulina 
imagines her body in the future is interesting because, through ‘thinking of having a 
nose job’, she invests some hope in a more beautiful future. In contrast to Fay who 
sees her future as one where what is wrong with her body ‘just go[es] away’, Paulina 
sees the future as one where what’s wrong can be made to go away. In line with our 
interest in points of connection rather than differentiation between our research 
projects, it is not our intention here to engage in a discussion which grounds the 
versions held of the futures by the teenage girls in Coleman’s research and the women 
in Moreno Figueroa’s research in their age; we do not, for example, mean to do a 
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comparative study and argue that it is because Paulina is older than Fay that she is 
‘wiser’ about what the future might hold and how the future may be controlled 
through making things happen. What we are interested in is how for both Paulina and 
Fay there is hopefulness for the future, understood through the possibilities of being 
beautiful. Taking up their comments, then, we want to think about hope and optimism 
as processes which seem indicative of the complicated and conflicting problem of 
beauty for feminist theory.  
 
Drawing on our explanation of affect not as things but as inclinations, we suggest here 
that, through beauty and embodiment, Fay and Paulina are inclined towards the future 
in a hopeful and/or optimistic wayiv. That is, despite the insecurity, the ordinariness, 
the problem of the present, what they might or might not do to their bodies in the 
present, the future is hoped for as a better – more beautiful – time.  In a similar way, 
Catherine and Tina, participants in Coleman’s research, are also inclined towards the 
future which they see as a happier time.  More specifically, they explicitly draw 
attention to the relationship between hope, optimism, normalcy and beauty:  
 
Beckie:  so in the future your body will be, you’ll be happier with it? 
Catherine:  yeah, happier 
Beckie:  what do you think? 
Tina:  I don’t know, it depends whether I get taller and like stuff, if I stay 
this height then I’m just gonna be that little fat girl but if I get taller 
then I think it’ll be better 
 
Catherine and Tina present here a case that being happier with their bodies is closely 
linked with beauty and its implied parameters of normalcy (being taller for example).  
However, what is interesting here is that their image of this happier future is 
somewhat vague.  The relations between this point in the present (of being, in Tina’s 
words, ‘that little fat girl’) and the future that will ‘be better’ are imprecise and not 
straightforward.  There is no sense of how such a future will be achieved.  Instead, the 
future is a temporality which is inclined towards; not as a particular content nor 
through a specific set of practices, but rather through a feeling that ‘it will be better’.  
Such a vague image of the future, or such a feeling that it just will be better, is also 
what seems to be at stake in Fay’s and Paulina’s descriptions of a better, more 
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beautiful and more normal, future: ‘the right figure’, ‘skin’, a different nose. It is 
perhaps mistaken to suggest that Fay, Tina, Catherine and Paulina do not have more 
precise notions of what will make them beautiful and how they will achieve beauty 
that were not expressed in their interviews. It would also be mistaken to suggest that 
simply by having precise notions of beauty and plans to become beautiful the 
relations between the present and future are straightforward. However, what we are 
interested in here is how beauty is understood as something that is not possible in the 
present but might be possible in the future. 
Beauty, optimism and hope 
So far we have suggested that the ‘lure’ of beauty, for the girls and women discussed 
above, involves a temporal displacement to the past or deferral to the future.  We have 
argued that an attention to beauty not only as specific practices but also as a bodily 
inclination is crucial in order to explore what Felski, among others, has identified as 
the contradictions inherent in contemporary understandings and experiences of beauty.  
Indeed, as Colebrook proposes, both philosophical accounts of aesthetic beauty that 
emphasise how ‘the beautiful may have been defined through a series of gendered and 
sexist examples and assumptions’ (2006, 134) and those that see beauty as feeling, 
irreducible to utility and industry, are necessary for feminist theory.  To explore the 
relationship between beauty and hope further, we want to take up these different 
conceptions of aesthetic beauty and map them on to the ways in which we see both 
optimism and hope as important to understanding the experiences of beauty that 
emerged in our research.   
 
Berlant’s notion of inclination, on which we have drawn so far, can be helpfully 
considered in relation to two other of her concepts; ‘cruel optimism’ (2006) and 
‘aspirational normalcy’ (2007). Berlant defines the latter concept as ‘a desire to feel 
normal and to feel normalcy as a ground of dependable life, a life that does not have 
to keep being reinvented’ (2007, 281). Normalcy is a position which is not derided but 
desired by those who do not have access to it.  Berlant’s focus on normalcy is 
interesting for our argument here given how feminist work on beauty has identified 
‘feeling normal’ as a key impetus for women’s decisions to have cosmetic surgery 
(Davis 1995) and to engage in bodily practices including dieting, exercise and beauty 
treatments (Gimlin 2002).  Drawing on this work, then, we can partly understand the 
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girls’ and women’s inclinations to the past and the future as an aspiration to feel 
normal.  Feeling normal in the cases we have discussed might involve feeling as if 
their looks were unimportant (as with Fay’s and Anna’s inclination to the past, for 
example, or with Paulina’s identification with academia), feeling as if in the future 
they will look more beautiful (as in the case of Fay, Paulina, Catherine and Tina’s 
experiences discussed in the previous section) or feeling as if skin colour and bodily 
appearance did not matter in a racist culture (as with Patricia as an example of the 
women who participated in Moreno Figueroa’s research).   
 
As we suggest that beauty works as a lure through which bodies are inclined to a past 
or future temporality, we think it is significant to examine how the present 
temporalities of the girls and women are difficult. That is, the aspiration to normalcy 
in the past or future involves an attachment that both offers promise and entails 
cruelty and compromise. To understand this we turn to Berlant’s concept of ‘cruel 
optimism’ which refers both to an ‘attachment’ to ‘compromised conditions of 
possibility’ and to how this attachment produces ‘something of the continuity of the 
subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in 
the world’ (2006, 21). Berlant’s cruel optimism, then, is not so much concerned with 
the content of the attachment (with what the attachment is or is to) as with what the 
attachment itself makes possible; an ability – a compromised ability – to live on and 
to look forward to being in the world.  Here we can conceive the girls’ and women’s 
present in terms of such a cruel optimism; in displacing beauty to the past or the 
future there is a promise that it is possible to ‘keep on living’ and, at the same time, a 
compromise of what ‘being in the world’ involves. 
 
Exploring beauty through the concept of cruel optimism, then, helps us to account for 
both the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of beauty as conceived in feminist theory 
and in philosophies of aesthetics.  It indicates how the bodily inclination towards 
beauty enables the ability to keep on living on. And, at the same time, through its 
attachment to a condition of possibility that is not in the interests of those bodies, such 
a bodily inclination towards beauty necessarily compromises that ability to keep on 
living on. Taking up Berlant’s argument here, we can conceive the understandings of 
beauty that emerge in our research as an attachment which makes possible a difficult 
(unbeautiful) present through a displacement or deferral to the past or future. 
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According to such an approach, the attachment to beauty is simultaneously a 
compromised condition of possibility and a means of making this compromised 
condition bearable. That is, by attaching to beauty, girls and women both limit their 
conditions of possibility (for example by experiencing the present as difficult) and 
live and look forward to extended conditions of possibility and normalcy (‘when I 
was/am beautiful, life was/will be better’). 
 
Cruel optimism, then, necessarily involves a difficult present.  That is, optimism is an 
attachment to a past or future temporality, and it is this attachment that makes the 
present both difficult and bearable.  In this sense, the optimism of Berlant is closer to 
the conception of hope that Ghasson Hage (2002) proposes, than the one we will 
propose here. For Hage, according to capitalist values and interests, hope is opposed 
to joy; ‘[i]nstead of living an ethic of joy, we live an ethic of hope, and that becomes 
an ethic of deferring joy which fits in very much with the idea of saving and deferring 
gratification’ (2002: 151). Indeed, Berlant explains the concept of cruel optimism 
through three examples ‘of the suspension of the reproduction of habituated or 
normative life. These suspensions open up the “impasse” as a name for the 
transitional moment between a habituated life and all of its others’(2006, 23)  and 
render the normative, disappointing rhythm of life clear. The present, as suspension, 
thus takes on an impossibility and Berlant asks, ‘How long have people thought about 
the present as having weight, being a thing disconnected from other things, an 
obstacle to living?’ (2006, 24) 
 
In Berlant’s terms, we can understand the present for the girls and women involved in 
our research, as an obstacle to living through the suspension or deferral of beauty to a 
different temporality.  Understood through cruel optimism then, the present in its 
difficulty is both ‘disconnected from other things’ and attached to an other 
temporality.  However, for us, the question remains of whether such an understanding 
of beauty accounts for all of what is being explained in the extracts above.  Can the 
inclination to beauty be captured completely with the concept of cruel optimism?  It is 
in this sense that we would like to introduce a notion of hope in contrast to the 
conception of optimism drawn on here.  While for Berlant optimism is necessarily 
cruel and while for Hage the ‘ethic of hope’ is the deferral of joy, we suggest an 
alternative notion of hope, as that which is, or which might be, detached from deferral 
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and compromise and which is, instead, closer to the aesthetic attention to beauty as 
feeling.  Of course, we are not suggesting that such a notion of hope is what is ‘really’ 
at work in the experiences of beauty discussed above.  Not are we suggesting that the 
bodily inclination to beauty is outside of gendered and sexist interests and values; it is 
necessary, as both Berlant (2006) and Hage (2002) argue, for a critique of political 
economy to run ‘alongside’ a feminist analysis of beauty.  However, we propose a 
notion of hope in order to focus attention on how, as Colebrook puts it, ‘hope is 
structural to feminism’ and this hope ‘maps out some future that is at once other than 
the present and yet referenced to an unfulfilled actuality of the present’ (Colebrook: 
this volume).  If hope for a future which is ‘other’ to the present is ‘structural to 
feminism’, is there a way of thinking differently – more hopefully – about the 
experience of beauty?  What is the ‘unfulfilled actuality of the present’ that might 
make this different future possible?    
 
One way of thinking this through is in relation to Patricia’s practice of looking at and 
commenting on her photographs in her interview with Moreno Figueroa (2006).  
While we have discussed above how Patricia explored painful and difficult memories 
and experiences where the links between race, racism and beauty are in operation, she 
also described how looking at her photographs, as she was in her past but also while 
she was being interviewed, could produce different feelings: 
 
Patricia: I also like this photograph very much. I used to like myself, and I used 
to like looking at myself as a child. I used to like looking at myself and 
taking out these photographs, to raise my self-esteem. I used to say: 
“Look how nice, look, I'm beautiful”. Didn’t I? These photographs 
cheered me up because I felt uncomfortable with myself but when I 
saw these photographs I used to say, “Hey! But I'm not that ugly”. I 
saw them many times and with that intention, maybe I was 7 or 8 years 
old, and I said to myself: “Hey! But I'm not that ugly”. What can 
possibly have made me feel like that? I felt one way and then I saw 
myself another way. I liked my photographs... But there was that 
contradiction... that's why I’m showing them to you. 
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Here, then, Patricia explains how, looking back, she can see that, in contrast to her 
memories, ‘I’m not that ugly’.  For Patricia, seeing the contradictions of ‘feeling 
beauty’ – ‘I felt one way but then I saw myself another way’ – ‘rais[ed] my self-
esteem’.  In terms of our argument here, such a practice might be termed a return to 
and a recognition of the unfulfilled actuality of the present; a means of challenging the 
difficult present by re-experiencing the past. We suggest that this practice constitutes 
not so much ‘cruel optimism’ but hope as an ‘empirical question’, tied to everyday 
practices of ‘living on’ which are inclined to changing life for the better.  Furthermore, 
Patricia’s practice indicates, we think, hope for not only a better future (as the 
concepts of cruel optimism and aspirational normalcy suggest) but for a better present. 
It is not that Patricia completely re-invents her past (as discussed above it involves 
pain) but rather that what is unfulfilled about the past (‘I’m not that ugly’) is re-visited 
and re-experienced; is brought into the present.   Patricia’s present is not ‘suspended’ 
through an attachment to other temporalities but rather is being felt differently, at least 
in part, as it is lived. In this way, our ‘sense’ of hope can be conceived in terms of 
what Hage describes as ‘the ethic of joy’.  Hage summarises Spinoza’s notion of joy 
as follows: 
 
for Spinoza, joy comes from a simple change to the better in the state of the 
body. That is, it is an experience of reaching a higher state in the capacities to 
act, associate and deploy oneself in or with one’s environment which 
constitutes us as a specific “thing” in Spinoza’s language. So joy is not the 
experience of a static state of being, no matter how “high” that state is. Joy is 
the experience of a growth from one state of being to a more efficient one as it 
is happening. It is the experience of that quantum leap of the body, of the self 
as it is moving into a higher capacity to act (Hage 2002: 152). 
 
Hage’s account of Spinoza’s conception of joy is significant because of its emphasis 
on the experience of change or movement as it is happening (‘I’m not that ugly’).  
That is, in contrast to the ‘optimism’ that is involved in and produced through the 
movement from a difficult present to a better – more beautiful – past or future, joy 
here can be understood as a temporal experience that folds the past, present and future 
into each other and experiences the becoming better not in an other temporality but 
now, in the present.  This resonates with the notion of aesthetic beauty as feeling, ‘not 
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a feeling of the body but of the mind experiencing itself’ (Colebrook 2006: 133).  And, 
of course, it resonates with Patricia’s practice whereby she is able to find beauty not 
only in an other temporality but also, in part, in her present re-experience of the past.   
   
Our argument that, in the context of experiences of beauty, hope should be conceived 
in terms of this ethic of joy is thus part of a desire to shift the experience of beauty 
away from an always-already other temporality and into the present. This would be to 
address, in Berlant’s terms, the ‘weight of the present’ and to ‘interfere with varieties 
of immiseration’ rather than to ‘ride the wave of the system of attachment that [we] 
are used to’(Berlant 2006, 32) .  To draw on Hage’s argument, if not his vocabulary, it 
would be to develop an ‘ethics of hope’ which challenges the ethic of (cruel) 
optimism characteristic of Western capitalism in general, and of the girls and 
women’s experiences of beauty in particular.  It would be to see hope as embedded in 
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Notes 
i Berlant’s discussion is focused on Mary Gaitskill’s (1991) novel Two Girls, Fat and 
Thin. 
ii In explaining beauty as an affective inclination away from the present, our intention 
is not to suggest that time is some kind of linear advancement that underlies a body (it 
is not, for example, that bodies progress from or to beauty) but rather that we 
understand beauty as attachments to or dispositions towards specific temporalities 
(‘the past’ and ‘the future’). Temporality is in this sense a process: not something that 
is containable (an object) nor that develops in a logical, progressive fashion, but rather 
a dynamic condition through which bodies incline, in this case, to beauty.  
iii Güera is an adjective use to describe somebody who is perceived either as having 
white or whiter than skin colour or blond or light brown hair colour. It can be said of 
the fairest person in a given group, i.e. the family. 
iv In saying that there is an inclination towards the future we are not saying that the 
future is an object that can be aimed for. Rather, what we mean is that future is a 
temporal condition, different to the present. As a condition, the future is also 
prospective, meaning that it looks forward or is looked forward to: expected, hoped 
for. 
